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Abstract
The current study analyzed the effects of three frames of reward magnitude – quantity, volume,
and duration – on the rate at which college students discounted hypothetical, delayed monetary
rewards. Hypothetical scenarios were presented using the fill-in-the-blank discounting
questionnaire and participants made choices between immediate and delayed hypothetical
monetary rewards. Scenarios framed the monetary choices as (a) quantity of dollar bills, (b)
height (inches) of a stack of dollar bills, and (c) duration of time spent in a hypothetical cash
machine to collect dollar bills. For each scenario, participants’ subjective values were used to
calculate the area under the curve (AuC). Framing resulted in a moderate effect size: the duration
frame yielded significantly smaller AuC values compared to the quantity and volume frames.
Thus, the framing of reward magnitude was a significant variable in controlling discounting rates
for hypothetical, delayed monetary rewards. Subsequent investigations should be aware of the
independent effects of the reward magnitude frames on delay discounting rates.
Keywords: delay discounting, framing, reward magnitude, hypothetical rewards
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Delay discounting refers to the decrease in subjective value of a reward as a function of
the delay to accessing that reward (McKerchar & Renda, 2012). For example, an individual may
choose to receive an immediately available small sum of money instead of waiting for a larger
sum of money. The hypothesized behavioral mechanism for this choice is that the delay to
consuming the reward reduces the subjective value of the larger, delayed consequence in
comparison to the smaller, immediate consequence. This phenomenon has been well established
in a variety of contexts (see Green, Myerson, & Vanderveldt, 2014 for a review).
The value of rewards in the literature on delay discounting is measured with responses to
hypothetical or real-choice scenarios in which organisms choose between smaller, sooner and
larger, later rewards. (Green et al., 2014). Human experimental research shows choices involving
hypothetical, real, or potentially real rewards produce similar patterns of responding (e.g.,
Johnson & Bickel, 2002). That is, the rate at which a commodity decays across delays is similar
when participants choose between immediate and delayed hypothetical outcomes (e.g.,
hypothetical money) and immediate and delayed experiential outcomes (e.g., actual money),
though there have been reported exceptions (e.g., Green & Lawyer, 2014). One method for
assessing changes in subjective value across delays is an adjusting amount two-choice procedure.
In this procedure, the amount of the immediately available reward is increased or decreased (e.g.,
Maguire, Henson, & France, 2014) within a series of trials while the amount of a larger, delayed
reward remains fixed. Response allocation is measured across different delays to a reward, and
across a series of trials, the delay to the larger reward is varied. The crucial measure in each
series is the magnitude of the immediate reward that is subjectively equivalent to the delayed
reward (estimated from the choices made). This is known as the “indifference point” or
“subjective value.” A separate, more expeditious method for measuring changes in subjective
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value across delays is the fill-in-the-blank method (e.g., FITB: Weatherly, Terrell, & Derrene
2010). Using this method, participants are prompted to report the minimum magnitude of an
immediate reward they would be willing to accept instead of waiting for the delayed reward. For
example, a participant may report that he or she would be willing to receive no less than $750
right now instead of waiting six months to receive $1,000. Thus, the estimated subjective value
of the delayed $1,000 is $750.
Within the delay discounting literature, there is no parametric research on the effects of
different procedures to vary reward magnitude. In most studies, one of three procedures is used
to manipulate reward magnitude: quantity, volume or mass, or duration of access. These
procedures can be conceptualized as different “frames” (discussed below; see Koffarnus,
Jarmolowicz, Mueller, & Bickel, 2013 for a review). Discounting based on the quantity of a
reward has been investigated by presenting choices between an immediate relatively small
amount of a reward and a delayed relatively greater amount of a reward. For example,
participants might choose between a small amount of money now (e.g., $5) and a delayed greater
amount of money (e.g., $1000, Green & Lawyer, 2014). Thus, the key manipulation is the
quantity of the reward. Discounting of reward volume (i.e., mass) has been investigated by
presenting choices between immediate access to a relatively smaller size or mass of a reward and
a delayed relatively larger size or mass of a reward. For example, participants might choose
between a small piece of food now and a delayed larger piece of food (e.g., Friedel, DeHart,
Madden, & Odum, 2014; Odum, Baumann, & Rimington, 2006). Thus, the key manipulation is
the overall size or mass of the reward. Finally, discounting based on the duration of access to a
reward has been investigated by presenting choices between immediate access to a reward for a
relatively brief amount of time and delayed access to a reward for a relatively longer amount of
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time. For example, participants might choose between an immediately available opportunity to
access a preferred item for a relatively brief duration of time and a delayed opportunity to access
a preferred item for a relatively longer duration of time (e.g., Hirst & DiGennaro Reed, 2016).
Thus, the key manipulation is the duration of time to access a reward.
Though there is no parametric research on the independent effects of the framing of
reward magnitude on measures of delay discounting, the effects of framing have recently been
investigated as a related and relevant parameter (e.g., explicit zero, Magan, Dwech, & Gross,
2008; delay phrasing, DeHart & Odum, 2015; unit framing, DeHart, Friedel, Frye, Galizio, &
Odum, 2018). Framing effects refer to manipulations that change the way a scenario or outcome
is perceived (see Koffarnus, et al., 2013 for a review). Framing manipulations often result in
different discounting patterns despite no actual change to the parameters of the scenario (e.g.,
DeHart & Odum, 2015) or the parameters of the outcome (e.g., DeHart et al., 2018). Regarding
the framing of the scenario, Magan et al. (2008) found that participants discounted less when
choices were explicitly framed to emphasize the receipt of $0 for the non-preferred outcome. For
example, a scenario may ask, “Would you prefer (a) $10 today and then $0 in 30 days or (b) $0
today and then $50 in 30 days?” Furthermore, DeHart and Odum (2015) compared the framing
of delays as specific dates in the future (e.g., March 23) to the framing of delays in standard
calendar units (e.g., in 6 months) on the rate at which participants discounted hypothetical
monetary rewards. Time framed as specific dates resulted in less discounting compared to the
calendar units.
DeHart et al. (2018) also investigated the effects of framing outcomes on rates of
hypothetical monetary discounting. Participants responded to iterative discounting tasks that
framed immediate and delayed money in “clear” dollar units (e.g., $2, $50) or “fuzzy” (DeHart
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& Odum, 2018, p. 413) units of quarters (e.g., 1 handful of quarters, 6 handfuls of quarters).
Despite identical overall magnitudes of money, participants discounted fuzzy-framed money to a
greater degree compared to clearly framed money. The authors speculate that the response effort
(e.g., additional calculations, mediating verbal responses) for converting “fuzzy” units into clear
units may have been responsible for this effect.
Relevant to the framing of reward magnitudes is research on the magnitude effect (Green,
Myerson, & McFadden, 1997). That is, the magnitude of the delayed reinforcer also affects the
rate of discounting in hypothetical monetary scenarios. Larger amounts of money are discounted
to a lesser degree than smaller amounts of money. For example, individuals may select a delayed
reinforcer of $100,000 in the context of relatively lengthier delays compared to a delayed
reinforcer of $100 (Green et al., 1997).
Measuring changes in delay-discounting rates across frames of reward magnitude will
provide more detailed interpretations of the variables that affect delay-discounting rates and will
extend the extant literature on the effects of framing. Furthermore, if different frames produce
different discounting functions, then this parameter will be important to note in subsequent
experiments investigating the mechanisms responsible for delay discounting. The current study
examined the effects of three frames of reward magnitude (i.e., quantity, volume, and duration)
on the rate at which participants discounted the subjective value of a delayed reward. To assess
such effects, the current experiment included a version of the fill-in-the-blank (FITB) method of
measuring discounting used in Weatherly et al. (2010) in which participants self-reported the
subjective value of delayed monetary rewards. Participants were told the overall sums of money
were equivalent across the three frames of reward magnitude; thus, the framing of reward
magnitude served as the only difference between conditions.
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Method
Participants
In total, seventy-two college students participated in the experiment; however, data from
sixty-seven participants was used (see data omission criteria below). Twenty-one participants
self-identified as female and the average age was 22.3 years (SD = 2.1). All participants were
recruited through an online system used by the Department of Psychology at the University of
Wisconsin, Milwaukee. To be included in the study, participants were required to pass preexperimental training procedures (no participants were excluded due to failing pre-experimental
training procedures; see Appendix A for pre-experimental training procedures). All participants
received compensation for their participation in the form of extra credit in a selected course.
Experimental Procedure
Participants responded to 72 total questions (8 delays in each of 3 scenarios across 3
exposures to each scenario) during a 1-hour session in a private laboratory room. Each scenario
contained eight questions (one question for each delay: 0 days, 1 day, 1 week, 2 weeks, 1 month,
6 months, 1 year, and 5 years) and used one of the three frames of reward magnitude (quantity,
volume, duration). Scenarios were presented in a randomized order for each participant and the
eight questions within each scenario were also presented in a randomized order. Once the
participant responded to all the questions in one scenario, the next scenario was introduced.
Following completion of every scenario once, the scenarios were presented again. Scenarios
were presented in a similar fashion for a total of three times each. That is, participants responded
to the same questions within scenarios on three separate occasions.
A laptop computer contained the PsychoPy software (PsychoPy, Pierce, 2007) that was
used to create and run the FITB discounting questionnaire (Weatherly et al., 2010). The
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questionnaire contained three different scenarios in which participants were instructed to first
read a brief introduction to the scenario. The brief introduction to the scenarios was on the screen
for at least 5 s after which point participants could advance at their own pace. Following the
introduction, participants were prompted to respond to eight different hypothetical questions
presented one at a time for at least 1 s (following 1 s, participants could respond at their own
pace). Table 1 contains the written introductions for each of the three scenarios.
Quantity frame. Participants read scenarios with choices between different amounts of
money. Following the initial instruction, participants were prompted to input the minimum
amount of money that they preferred now, instead of waiting [delay] to receive $1000.
Participants responded to each question by adjusting a slider on the computer screen to values
between $0 and $1000. The slider value started at $0, and moving the slider caused synchronous
one-dollar incremental changes in the fill-in-the-blank numeric value above the slider.
Volume frame. Participants read scenarios with choices between different stacks of onedollar bills that varied according to the height (inches) of the stack. Following the initial
instruction, participants were prompted to input the minimum height of one-dollar bills that they
preferred now, instead of waiting [delay] to receive a 4.3-in stack of one-dollar bills. Participants
were instructed that the height a one-dollar bill was 0.0043 in. Participants responded to each
question by adjusting a slider on the computer screen to values between 0.0 in and 4.3 in. The
slider value started at 0.0 in and moving the slider caused synchronous 0.1-in incremental
changes in the fill-in-the-blank numeric value above the slider.
Duration frame. Participants read scenarios with choices between different durations of
time (in seconds) to access a cash machine (“Money Tornado”) that contained 200 five-dollar
bills. Following the initial instruction, participants were prompted to input the minimum duration
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of time that they preferred now, instead of waiting [delay] to receive 100 s to access the cash
machine. Participants were instructed to assume that they could grab two bills per second (i.e.,
accumulate $10 per s) while in the machine. Participants responded to each question by adjusting
a slider on the computer screen to values between 0 s and 100 s. The slider value started at 0 s,
and moving the slider caused synchronous 1-s incremental changes in the fill-in-the-blank
numeric value above the slider.
Dependent Variables
For each participant, we measured the slider value at each delay for each frame. These
values were used to calculate the mean subjective value at each delay for each frame across
participants. Though it is uncommon to use a multiple-exposure method in delay-discounting
research, we did so to measure any practice effects. There were no statistically significant
differences (data available from first author upon request) in participants’ discounting curves
across exposures, thus inferential analyses (described below) used participants’ responses from
the first exposure to each frame.
Data omission criteria. A participant’s data were not included in the final analyses if
mean response patterns met either of the following criteria (Johnson & Bickel, 2008): (a) if any
subjective value was greater than the preceding subjective value by 20%, or (b) if the first (0-day
delay) and last (5-year delay) subjective values did not differ by at least 10%. Five participants’
data met the omission criteria (6.9% of participants); thus, data from 67 participants were
included in the final analyses.
Data Analysis
The results were analyzed in two ways. First, participants’ individual discounting curves
were aggregated to form a singular discounting curve for each frame of reward magnitude. The
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aggregated discounting curves were visually analyzed to identify frame-specific patterns in
discounting.
Second, participants’ discounting curves for each frame were used to calculate a measure
of area under curve (AuC):
𝐴𝑢𝐶 = ∑(𝑥2 − 𝑥1 ) [

𝑦1 + 𝑦2
]
2

where x2 and x1 refer to adjacent standardized delays to a reward, and y1 and y2 refer to adjacent
standardized subjective values at x1 and x2 delays, respectively. Because AuC is a normalized
measure, it tends to produce normal or close-to-normal distributions fit for parametric and
nonparametric analyses (Myerson, Green, & Warusawitharana, 2001). The mean AuC for each
frame was generated by averaging participants’ AuC values yielded from the individual
discounting curves in each frame. Thus, three mean AuC values were calculated: one for the
quantity frame, one for the volume frame, and one for the duration frame. A one-way repeatedmeasures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to analyze whether significant differences
were present between the mean AuC measures in the three frames. Planned follow-up analyses
compared specific frames and used a Bonferroni alpha-correction (α = 0.017) to control for
Type-I errors.
Results
Pre-experimental training lasted an average 11.2 min (SD = 1.30). All participants met
mastery criteria (i.e., at least 10% correspondence between discrete-trial training and fill-in-theblank training; see Appendix A) by the end of the 10 programmed practice trials. No participants
required additional training or corrective instruction.
Across participants and frames, subjective values at each delay formed a normal
distribution (see Table 2). With the exception of the 0-day delay, 1-day delay, and 1-week delay,
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self-reported subjective values had skewness and kurtosis values within acceptable ranges (+2
and -2; George & Mallery, 2010). The high skewness and kurtosis values for these delays is due
to little variation in the data (indicated by the relatively low standard deviations) and an overall
ceiling effect (i.e., subjective values could not surpass 1.0). During the first exposure to the FITB
task, 11 participants reported subjective values less than 1.0 (range, 0.35 – 0.95) for the 0-day
delay indicating a failure to maximize hypothetical rewards. These participants were included in
the study, as their overall patterns of discounting did not meet the data omission criteria.
Three separate factorial repeated-measures ANOVAs determined if any main effects
existed because of (a) ordering of scenarios, (b) self-reported gender, and (c) self-reported age.
Concerning the ordering of scenarios, a computer program randomly presented scenarios in one
of six different order. A 6 (order of scenarios) x 3 (frames) factorial repeated-measures ANOVA
yielded no significant main effects of AuC across the orders of scenarios, p = 0.403. A 2 (selfreported gender) x 3 (frames) factorial repeated-measures ANOVA yielded no significant main
effects of AuC between genders, p = 0.814. A 2 (median-split age: 23) x 3 (frames) factorial
repeated-measures ANOVA yielded no significant main effects of AuC between age groups (i.e.,
< 23 or  23), p = 0.660. In sum, the above analyses indicate that participants had similar
responses across frames independent of (a) the order of scenarios, (b) self-reported gender, and
(c) self-reported age.
Aggregated discounting curves were compared to determine the effect of the different
frames on delay discounting. Figures 1A and 1B shows the three different discounting curves
yielded by the three frames. The quantity and volume frames yielded nearly identical discounting
curves with relatively greater subjective values at all hypothetical delays, compared to the
duration frame.
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The repeated-measures ANOVA showed significant differences in the mean AuC
measures across frames, F(2, 132) = 15.56, p < 0.001; 2 = 0.22. Figure 3 shows the distribution
of AuC measures across the three frames. The quantity and volume frames yielded nearly
identical mean AuC measures (MQuantity = 0.54, SD = 0.22, MVolume = 0.57, SD = 0.22). The
duration frame yielded the lowest mean AuC measure (MDuration = 0.44, SD = 0.23). Planned
post-hoc analyses showed significant differences between the quantity and duration frames [t(66)
= 3.70, p = 0.001; d = 0.52] and the volume and duration frames [t(66) = 5.40, p < 0.001; d =
0.77].
Discussion
The current study found that the framing of reward magnitude was a significant variable
in determining the rate at which participants discounted delayed access to hypothetical money. In
general, quantity and volume frames yielded the shallowest discounting curves (i.e., the delayed
reward retained relatively more of its subjective value), whereas the duration frame yielded the
steepest discounting curve (i.e., the delayed reward retained relatively less of its subjective
value).
The results of the current study extend the research on changes in discounting rates across
experimental parameters and framing. Previous research has demonstrated participants discount
delayed rewards to a greater degree when delays are framed as calendar units (e.g., in days,
months) as opposed to specific dates (DeHart & Odum, 2015) and when the magnitude of the
rewards are framed using undiscernible measurements (i.e., “fuzzy” units, DeHart et al., 2018, p.
413). The current study showed hypothetical monetary outcomes framed as amounts of time to
consume (i.e., time in the cash machine) result in significantly steeper discounting curves
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compared to monetary outcomes framed as quantities (i.e., number of dollar bills) and volumes
(i.e., height of a stack of dollar bills).
The results of the current study also extend prior research on the magnitude effect.
Previous studies (e.g., Green et al., 1997) show that larger magnitudes of a hypothetical delayed
monetary reward (e.g., $100,000) yield shallower discounting compared to smaller delayed
hypothetical monetary rewards (e.g., $100). However, our findings demonstrate that the reward
magnitude frame also affects the rate at which subjective values decay across delays to a
hypothetical reward. Quantity and volume frames resulted in approximately equal decay rates,
whereas the duration frame resulted in an accelerated decay rate.
There are at least three potential explanations for these findings. First, different
magnitude frames may have occasioned differential levels of discriminability (deVilliers, 1977).
The discrimination of differences in magnitude of quantity and volume can occur at any point.
For example, a small quantity of money can be immediately distinguishable from a large
quantity of money. In contrast, the discrimination of a short duration of access to a reward from a
long duration of access to a reward cannot occur at any point in time. For example, a relatively
longer duration of time to access a reward can only be discriminated after the passage of time.
Relatedly, framing of monetary outcomes in units as quantity, volume, and duration
likely occasioned differential levels of unit discriminability. That is, the sums of money framed
in volumetric units (inches) and duration units (seconds) may have required participants to
convert such units to clearer, more discriminable units (quantities) before they responded to the
discounting scenarios. Similar to DeHart et al. (2018), when two identical sums of money are
differentially framed across levels of unit-discriminability (i.e., clear and fuzzy), the sum of
money framed in clear units results in shallower discounting compared to the sum of money
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framed in fuzzy units. In contrast to DeHart et al. (2018), the findings from the current study
suggest that the effects of monetary framing are specific to certain frames (e.g., duration) and not
others (e.g., volume).
Finally, uncertainty concerning the magnitude of the immediate or delayed reward could
increase the rate at which subjective values decayed for the duration frame. Although each
participant was instructed to assume that he or she could collect two five-dollar bills per second,
participants may have perceived that the amount of money earned would be dependent on his or
her subjective ability to rapidly collect money while in the Money Tornado. In the current study,
subjective values for the duration frame were on average 7% lower than the mean subjective
values for the volume and quantity frames. Thus, it is possible that the perceived unpredictability
accounted for a portion of the differential decay in subjective value across delays for the duration
frame. Findings from studies that investigated the interaction between probabilistic and delayed
rewards suggest that levels of uncertainty interact with delays to control the rate at which
subjective values decay for delayed hypothetical monetary rewards (Cox & Dallery, 2016;
Ostaszewski, Green & Myerson, 1998). Future research may avoid the mentioned complications
concerning perceived uncertainty by framing the scenario to exclude any mention of participant
requirements.
The current study contained several limitations. The first limitation is that the selected
commodity (i.e., money) likely has a lengthy history of pairing with one of our selected frames
(i.e., quantity). That is, most of our participants have likely had the opportunity to practice
differentiating between quantities of money prior to the experiment. In comparison, participants
may have had less frequent opportunities to practice differentiating between stack sizes of money
or durations of time to collect money. Nevertheless, our results showed that participants had
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similarly shallow discounting curves for quantity and volume. Thus, more frequent exposure to a
frame of reward magnitude alone does not likely account for the results.
A second limitation was the use of verbal descriptions (i.e., instructions and response
slider) of hypothetical money to measure changes in the subjective value of a reward. The verbal
descriptions may not have occasioned equally optimal contexts to discriminate differences in the
magnitude of money across the three frames. Investigations may address this limitation by
having participants complete the FITB delay-discounting questionnaire via the computer
program using the current study’s verbal descriptions of hypothetical money and then complete a
version of the FITB delay-discounting questionnaire in vivo. For example, participants could be
presented different stacks of money and asked to create a stack of money they perceive to be
subjectively equivalent to the stack of money available after the specified delay.
The current study’s methodology and findings could be compared to other procedures
designed to measure differences in the subjective value of a reward across changing reward
parameters. For example, the value of a reward in applied studies is often evaluated within a
progressive-ratio (PR) schedule. During a PR schedule, the response requirement to access a
reward is increased following each consumption of the reward. The PR schedule at which
responding ceases for a specified duration of time is referred to as a break point (Chance, 2014).
Break points have been used to determine the value of different quantities (e.g., quantities of an
edible; Tiger et al., 2010), volumes (e.g., volume of sucrose solution; Rickard, Body, Xhang,
Bradshaw, & Szababi, 2009) and durations of access to rewards (e.g., duration of time to access
tangible items; Trosclair-Lasserre, Lerman, Addison, & Kodak, 2008) although no study has
parametrically examined differences in break points across frames of reward magnitude.
Findings from comparisons of these procedures may (a) highlight the extent to which similar
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behavioral mechanisms control responding in each context, (b) demonstrate the effects of
different frames of reward magnitude on responding in other contexts, and (c) help to develop a
feasible assessment method to account for idiosyncratic differences in the control exerted by
different frames of reward magnitude.
In conclusion, the results of the current study indicate that the frame of reward magnitude
is a significant determinant of the rate at which hypothetical delayed monetary rewards decay in
subjective value. Whereas some research shows that individual discounting rates tend to remain
relatively stable in the context of a single commodity (e.g., Weatherly et al., 2010), the present
investigation found significant differences in discounting for the same commodity across three
frames of reward magnitude. Taken together, observed measures of delay discounting should be
interpreted in the context of the commodity and frame of reward magnitude.
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Figure 1A. Participants’ mean subjective values across frames. Each data point corresponds to
the average subjective value across participants at the hypothetical delay. Error bars correspond
to standard error.

See Figure 1B

DELAY DISCOUNTING AND MAGNITUDE FRAMES

22

Figure 1B. Participants’ mean subjective values across frames for hypothetical delays: 0 days –
1 month.

DELAY DISCOUNTING AND MAGNITUDE FRAMES
Figure 2. Participants’ AuC values across frames. The crosses indicated the mean AuC value.
The bars indicate the mean AuC value for each condition. Bold lines indicate significant
differences between mean AuC values (p < 0.001).
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Table 1. Instructions for scenarios in FITB delay-discounting questionnaire. For each scenario,
the maximum sum of money that can be selected is $1000 (Quantity: 1000 one-dollar bills =
$1000; Volume: 4.3 inches of one-dollar bills = $1000; Duration: 2 five-dollar bills per second x
100 seconds = $1000).
Scenario
Quantity frame

Volume frame

Duration frame

Instructions
Imagine that you have been awarded $1000 dollars as a lottery prize. You will have the
opportunity to select between different amounts of money you’d prefer to receive now,
instead of waiting to receive your full $1000 lottery prize.
Imagine that you have randomly been awarded a 4.3-inch stack of one-dollar bills. You will
have the opportunity to choose different heights of stacks of one-dollar bills you’d prefer now
instead of waiting to receive the 4.3-inch stack of one-dollar bills. Assume that the height of a
singular one-dollar bill is 0.0043 inches.
Imagine that you have been awarded the opportunity to spend 100 seconds in a cash machine
(e.g., Money Tornado). This machine contains 200 five-dollar bills ($1000 total). While in
the machine, you can grab as much money as possible. You will have the opportunity to
choose amounts of time to spend in the machine now instead of waiting to spend 100 seconds
in the machine.
Assume that you can grab 2 bills per second.
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Table 2. Measures of univariate normality for self-reported subjective values across scenarios.
The measures of central tendency and variability are derived from the first exposure to each
scenario.
Quantity frame

Volume frame

Duration frame

Mean
Standard
Deviation
Skewness
Kurtosis
Mean
Standard
Deviation
Skewness
Kurtosis
Mean
Standard
Deviation
Skewness
Kurtosis

0 Days
0.968
0.143

1 Day
0.933
0.149

1 Week
0.879
0.202

2 Weeks
0.840
0.214

1 Month
0.811
0.235

6 Months
0.688
0.246

1 Year
0.563
0.243

5 Years
0.440
0.244

-5.579
32.896

-2.805
7.699

-2.312
5.463

-1.667
2.741

-1.473
1.619

-0.843
-0.062

-0.365
-0.312

0.033
-0.581

0.962
0.164

0.900
0.230

0.857
0.213

0.823
0.243

0.776
0.267

0.709
0.222

0.620
0.254

0.440
0.223

-4.702
21.809

-2.624
6.105

-2.24
4.366

-1.836
2.866

-1.358
1.024

-0.846
0.381

-0.628
-0.034

-0.022
-0.413

0.941
0.193

0.881
0.197

0.776
0.268

0.726
0.264

0.682
0.259

0.607
0.248

0.448
0.276

0.361
0.246

-3.779
13.946

-2.196
4.915

-1.274
0.668

-0.833
-0.312

-0.574
-0.562

-0.322
-0.511

0.182
-0.933

0.587
-0.089
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Appendix A. Pre-Experimental Training Procedures and Data
Ordinal ranking training. Participants were instructed to order index cards from left to
right according to their ordinal rank, based on each frame of reward magnitude. The
discrimination of quantity was assessed by having participants order amounts of money from the
smallest to largest amount of money. The discrimination of volume was assessed by having
participants order heights (measurements in inches) from the smallest to largest height. The
discrimination of duration was assessed by having participants order amounts of time (e.g., 1
day, 1 month, 1 year) from the smallest to largest amount of time. If the participant made an
error in ordering the stimuli, the experimenter pointed out the error, re-presented the same index
cards, and repeated the instruction to order the stimuli from smallest to largest. The experimenter
provided brief praise following each instance of correct ordering of the index cards.
Virtual slider training. The experimenter provided brief oral and written instructions on
the use of the virtual slider in the computer program which was followed by several practice
opportunities for the participant to adjust a slider to match a number on the computer screen. For
example, if the sample number was 63, the participant was required to adjust the virtual slider to
match 63. The slider had a range of values from 0 to 100. The experimenter provided brief
descriptive praise for each correct match (e.g., “Nice work matching the slider to the sample
number”). If participants made an error, the experimenter provided corrective feedback via a
vocal and model prompt (e.g., “Match the slider to the sample number, 63, like this.” [moved
slider to correct position]) and repeated the trial.
Practice trials. Participants responded to several example training scenarios, referred to
as adjusting-amount practice trials, which were conducted on the laptop using the same program
interface as the experimental procedure. Each practice scenario included a brief introduction and
two questions. The questions presented choices between an immediately available reward and a
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delayed reward (scenario 1: 30 days; scenario 2: 60 days). For example, participants were
instructed to select between an immediately available sum of money (e.g., $1) and a delayed sum
of money ($50 in 30 days). The immediately available sum of money was iteratively increased to
identify the sum of money at which the participant shifted his or her responding from the delayed
sum of money to the immediate sum of money. Twenty practice trials (10 trials for each
scenario) were conducted for each of the three magnitude frames.
After completing the adjusting-amount practice trials, participants were told about the
availability of a more rapid method to measure their choices between options, referred to as
open-ended practice trials (cf., fill-in-the-blank method; Weatherly, Terrell, & Derenne, 2010).
For example, participants were asked, “What is the minimum amount of money you’d be willing
to receive now, instead of waiting [30 days or 60 days] to receive $50?” Participants responded
by adjusting a virtual slider on the computer screen to a value between $0 and $50.
Comprehension of the question was measured by the degree of correspondence in the
values between the adjusting-amount practice trials (i.e., preference reversal value) and the openended practice trials (i.e., self-reported subjective value). That is, approximately the same value
(within 10%) was required in each type of trial. The participant continued to respond to the openended exposure trials until the slider values were within 10% of the adjusting-amount practice
trials for two consecutive practice opportunities.

